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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bribery, most commonly defined as “the abuse of public office for 
private gain,”1 is detrimental in both the public and the private 
sector.2 In light of this, the tenets of the anti-bribery provisions of the 
 
 1.  Ophelie Brunelle-Quraishi, Assessing the Relevancy and Efficacy of the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A Comparative Analysis, 2 NOTRE 
DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 101, 111 (2011). 
 2.  See Nancy Zucker Boswell, An Emerging Consensus on Controlling 
Corruption, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1165, 1165–66 (1997) (indicating the 
unacceptable cost of corruption to private sector earnings and public sector 
interests); Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Recent Developments in Foreign and Domestic 
Criminal Commercial Bribery Laws, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 151, 151 (stating that 
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United Nations Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”) harshly 
condemn both public and private sector bribery.3 Though the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)—which serves as the primary 
instrument of the United States’ compliance with the anti-bribery 
provisions of the UNCAC—recently has undergone unprecedented 
expansion, it still fails to address the full spectrum of bribery that the 
UNCAC criminalizes.4 Despite being non-mandatory, the UNCAC’s 
provision prohibiting private sector bribery will have significant 
implications for the future of United States federal law and 
international law as a whole. 
The United States has long acknowledged the issue of bribery in 
international business transactions as a serious threat.5 Recently, the 
international community as a whole has begun to recognize that 
bribery in international commercial transactions is an issue that 
deserves attention because of its far-reaching negative 
repercussions.6 Consequently, various multinational agreements have 
 
bribery can take the form of corrupt payments between private parties and need not 
involve a public actor). 
 3.  E.g., R. Rajesh Babu, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: 
A Critical Overview, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK 3 (Mar. 1, 2006). 
 4.  See Pilot Review Programme: United States of America, U.N. OFFICE ON 
DRUGS AND CRIME 12 (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.unodc.org/documents/ 
treaties/UNCAC/PilotReview/USA_Final_Country_Report_UNCAC-PRP.pdf 
[hereinafter U.N. Pilot Review Programme] (noting that the FCPA established as a 
criminal offense the conduct described in UNCAC Article 16, the bribery of public 
foreign officials); see also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Response of 
the United States of America to the Comprehensive Self-Assessment Checklist, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE 47–48 (July 10, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
fcpa/docs/USA-UNCAC-Self-Assessment.pdf [hereinafter USA UNCAC Self-
Assessment] (showing that, among the measures establishing the United States’ 
compliance with Article 21 (private sector bribery), the FCPA is not included as a 
relevant law). 
 5.  See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal 
Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. 
L. REV. 489, 501 (2011) (asserting that the United States was the first country to 
adopt anti-bribery legislation and that it remained the only country with anti-
bribery prohibitions for twenty years after the passage of the FCPA); see also 
Thomas J. White, U.S. Efforts to Combat Foreign Corrupt Practices, 92 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 162, 163 (1998) (stating that the United States has 
criminalized bribery through the use of the FCPA since 1977).   
 6.  See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 118 (2010) (reporting that there 
have been a series of anti-bribery and anti-corruption international agreements 
reached in the past decade); see also Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 103 
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been created to address the problem of international commercial 
bribery.7 The UNCAC represents the most comprehensive and 
inclusive agreement created thus far.8 
The United States has signed and ratified the UNCAC,9 which 
impresses various obligations related to corruption upon its 
signatories.10 Specifically, UNCAC Article 16(1) and Article 21 
prohibit international commercial bribery in both the public and the 
private sector.11 The FCPA is the United States’ primary instrument 
for combating international commercial bribery;12 it does not 
explicitly address private sector bribery, however, provoking the 
question of whether it can be used to address the spectrum of bribery 
incorporated by the UNCAC.13 
This comment asserts that the scope of the FCPA has expanded 
through emerging enforcement trends toward application in the 
private sector; the applicability of the FCPA within the private 
sector, however, remains limited. Therefore, the FCPA does not 
 
(acknowledging that the various international anti-corruption agreements that have 
been created in a short period of time imply that combating corruption has become 
an international priority). 
 7.  See Bixby, supra note 6, at 92 (positing that the creation of significant 
anti-corruption international agreements within the past twenty years has 
influenced the way United States agencies enforce the FCPA). 
 8.  See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 106 (describing the UNCAC as 
“the leading international anti-corruption tool”); see also Michael Kubiciel, Core 
Criminal Law Provisions in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 9 
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 139, 140 (2009) (stating that the UNCAC marks the peak of 
the anti-corruption movement within the international community). 
 9.  Misty Robinson, Global Approach to Anti-Bribery and Corruption, an 
Overview: Much Done, but a Lot More to Do, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 314 
(2012). 
 10.  See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 102 (explaining that the UNCAC 
covers a spectrum of activities that fall within the “vast concept” of corruption); 
see also Robinson, supra note 9, at 308 (discussing the range of corruption 
criminalized by the UNCAC and the actions countries must take to prevent 
corruption). 
 11.  See United Nations Convention Against Corruption arts. 16, 21, Oct. 31, 
2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 154, 156 [hereinafter UNCAC] (addressing the bribery of 
foreign public officials in Article 16 and bribery in the private sector in Article 21). 
 12.  See Bixby, supra note 6, at 90 (stating that the FCPA occupies center stage 
in the United States’ efforts to address white-collar crime). 
 13.  Westbrook, supra note 5, at 494–95, 497 (asserting that the FCPA has 
been in use by the United States for a long time and has been greatly extended 
recently through new methods of enforcement). 
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comply with both anti-bribery provisions of the UNCAC. Part II of 
this comment will include background regarding the UNCAC and 
FCPA, as well as pertinent information regarding supplemental 
agreements that are of use to the present analysis. Part III argues that 
the United States does not meet the anti-bribery standards of the 
UNCAC because its federal anti-bribery provision, the FCPA, does 
not criminalize private sector bribery. Part IV will recommend ways 
that the United States can achieve full compliance with the 
UNCAC’s anti-bribery obligations, such as by amending the FCPA 
or adopting new legislation specifically addressing private sector 
bribery. Finally, Part V concludes that the FCPA does not fulfill all 
of the United States’ obligations under the UNCAC because it has 
not been used against purely private-to-private bribery, which 
UNCAC Article 21 prohibits. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 
The UNCAC’s wide acceptance illustrates the global 
acknowledgement of corruption’s destructiveness.14 The Ad Hoc 
Committee that carried out the negotiations for the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which was 
adopted on November 15, 2000, was the first to propose the need for 
a convention specifically addressing corruption.15 Recognizing that 
corruption posed too complex an issue to be covered exhaustively by 
a convention dealing with transnational organized crime, the United 
 
 14.  Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 105–06 (finding that the international 
community has grown increasingly aware of the consequences of corruption and is 
eager to take action, as illustrated by the UNAC garnering 140 signatures and fifty 
ratifications within four months after it entered into force). 
 15.  See Dimitri Vlassis, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
Origins and Negotiation Process, U.N. ASIA & FAR E. INST. FOR THE PREVENTION 
OF CRIME & THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS 127, http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/ 
pdf/RS_No66/No66_16VE_Vlassis2.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (stating that the 
question of a convention against corruption was first raised in connection with the 
negotiations for the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime); 
Antonio Argandoña, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and Its 
Impact on International Companies, 3 (Univ. of Navarra IESE Bus. Sch., Working 
Paper No. 656, 2006) (explaining that the United Nations decided that it was 
desirable to have an international legal instrument against corruption independent 
of the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime). 
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Nations (“UN”) eventually established the UNCAC.16 The 
Convention entered into force on December 14, 2005.17 
The Convention has three stated purposes: 
(a) To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption 
more efficiently and effectively; (b) To promote, facilitate and support 
international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and 
fight against corruption, including in asset recovery; (c) To promote 
integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and 
public property.18 
The goal of the UNCAC is to provide a comprehensive 
international instrument that establishes a common language and 
guidelines to unify international corruption legislation.19 
The FCPA is the United States’ domestic means of criminalizing 
bribery per the requirements of the UNCAC.20 Compliance with the 
UNCAC is monitored through a system of peer review.21 The 
UNCAC assigns the responsibility of periodically reviewing the 
Member States’ implementation of the UNCAC to the Conference of 
the State Parties to the Convention.22 Consequently, Poland and 
Sweden reviewed the United States in 2009.23 Though the review did 
 
 16.  Vlassis, supra note 15, at 127; see also Argandoña, supra note 15, at 3 
(noting that the Ad Hoc Committee for the negotiation of the convention met for 
the first time in 2001 and held seven official sessions between 2002 and 2003 in 
Vienna). 
 17.  See Robinson, supra note 9, at 307. 
 18.  UNCAC, supra note 11, at 146. 
 19.  See Argandoña, supra note 15, at 4 (recognizing that the approach of 
UNCAC toward unifying international corruption regulation is limited by the 
recognition of state sovereignty and numerous differences between State Parties, 
such as their various levels of economic development). 
 20.  See USA UNCAC Self-Assessment, supra note 4, at 12 (identifying the 
FCPA as the applicable U.S. law implementing the measures described in Article 
16(1)). 
 21.  See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 136 (describing the UNCAC’s peer 
review mechanism as a non-adversarial systematic examination and assessment of 
the performance of a state by other states which relies on mutual trust and a shared 
confidence in the process); Robinson, supra note 9, at 308 (stating that the 
UNCAC requires states to cooperate closely with each other in all aspects of the 
fight against corruption).  
 22.  See UNCAC, supra note 11, at 151–52 (listing mechanisms for proper 
implementation of the UNCAC). 
 23.  U.N. Pilot Review Programme, supra note 4, at 1. 
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not examine all UNCAC articles,24 the review team identified the 
FCPA as a successful method of compliance with Article 16(1).25 
The UNCAC as a whole has a wide scope; this comment, 
however, will focus primarily on the UNCAC’s criminalization of 
bribery in international business transactions by Articles 16(1) and 
21.26 Article 16 “Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and Officials of 
Public International Organizations” states, 
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may 
be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed 
intentionally, the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or 
an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of 
an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person 
or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise 
of his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other 
undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international business.27 
The UNCAC defines a foreign public official as “any person 
holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a 
foreign country, whether appointed or elected; and any person 
exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a 
public agency or public enterprise.”28 Article 16(1) is a mandatory 
provision while Article 21 is non-mandatory.29 
In an effort to compromise between the United States’ objections 
to criminalizing bribery in the private sector and Europe’s desire to 
prohibit bribery in the private sector, the parties to the negotiation 
 
 24.  See id. at 2 (stating the review examined the following articles: “5 
(preventative anti-corruption policies and practices); 15 (bribery of national public 
officials); 16 (bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public 
international organizations); 17 (embezzlement, misappropriation or other 
diversion of property by a public official); 25 (obstruction of justice); 46 (mutual 
legal assistance) . . . and 53 (measures for direct recovery of property)”). 
 25.  Id. at 12–13 (stating that the FCPA is sufficient to bring the United States 
into compliance with the requirements of UNCAC Article 16(1)). 
 26.  See Robinson, supra note 9, at 307–08 (observing that the UNCAC 
concerns the prevention of corruption in its member countries’ public and private 
sectors and also calls for the investigation and prosecution of corruption). 
 27.  UNCAC, supra note 11, at 154. 
 28.  Id. at 147. 
 29.  Kubiciel, supra note 8, at 141 (stating that although several articles of the 
UNCAC are non-mandatory provisions, the UNCAC makes certain core provisions 
mandatory). 
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process made Article 21 non-mandatory.30 Article 21 “Bribery in the 
Private Sector” states, 
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when 
committed intentionally in the course of economic, financial or 
commercial activities: (a) The promise, offering or giving, directly or 
indirectly, of an undue advantage to any person who directs or works, in 
any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or herself 
or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her 
duties, act or refrain from acting; (b) The solicitation or acceptance, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage by any person who directs or 
works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself 
or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or 
her duties, act or refrain from acting.31 
No supplementary official or semi-official commentary to the 
UNCAC exists.32 
B. THE FCPA: THE UNITED STATES’ DOMESTIC METHOD OF 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNCAC’S ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS 
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977.33 The law prohibits any 
issuer, domestic concern, or any person from “mak[ing] use of the 
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce 
corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or 
authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to 
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value.”34 To 
constitute an offence under the FCPA, these acts must be directed to 
“any foreign official,” “any foreign political party or official thereof 
or any candidate for foreign political office,” or “any person, while 
 
 30.  See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 115 (discussing the contentions 
between the United States and the EU during the Convention negotiations 
regarding the inclusion of a private-sector bribery prohibition within the UNCAC). 
 31.  UNCAC, supra note 11, at 156. 
 32.  See Kubiciel, supra note 8, at 139 (discussing that without an official or 
semi-official commentary concerning the content of the UNCAC it is difficult for 
Member States to implement the provisions).  
 33.  See Bixby, supra note 6, at 92–93 (explaining that the Watergate scandal 
was a driving force behind the FCPA’s enactment in 1977; investigations into 
illegal accounts and illicit payments connected to the Nixon campaign led to the 
conclusion that the rash of illegal and illicit payments could be curbed if legislation 
could punish companies that disguised bribes in their books). 
 34.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1998). 
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knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be 
offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign 
official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any 
candidate for foreign political office.”35  The FCPA defines a foreign 
official as 
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, 
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international 
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf 
of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for 
or on behalf of any public international organization.36 
Additionally, the bribe must have one of the following purposes: 
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his 
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any 
act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any 
improper advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign official to use his 
influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or 
influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in 
order to assist . . . in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or 
directing business to, any person.37 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) must prove the above-stated elements 
to determine whether bribery has occurred.38 
When enacted, the primary objective of the Act was to target illicit 
bribes made by United States firms to foreign officials.39 As the 
global environment changed, however, the FCPA had to adapt.40 
Consequently, the Act has been amended twice, once in 1988 and 
again in 1998.41 The United States has pursued violations of the 
 
 35.  Id. § 78dd-1(a)(1)–(3). 
 36.  Id. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A). 
 37.  Id. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(A)–(B). 
 38.  See Bixby, supra note 6, at 94 (noting that the FCPA contains a list of 
requirements that the SEC and DOJ must meet to prove bribery has occurred). 
 39.  Id. at 93. 
 40.  See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 105 (stating that the UNCAC is a 
product of a heightened consciousness of corruption as a growing threat). 
 41.  Bixby, supra note 6, at 97, 101 (discussing how the 1998 amendments 
broadened the scope of the FCPA to cover any individual who could be considered 
an agent of a corporation or any official, regardless of governmental level, in a 
foreign nation). 
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FCPA, both criminally and civilly, for incidents of bribery within 
international business transactions.42 The FCPA’s successful 
structure has been used as a model and motivation for the 
international community to address the problem of corruption.43 
C. THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF 
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: ASSESSING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF THE 
FCPA 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”) closely 
parallels the approach of the FCPA.44 It was created under strong 
pressure from the United States due to the United States’ desire to 
encourage the criminalization of bribery in international business 
transactions.45 The OECD Convention is narrowly tailored to 
specifically address international commercial bribery of foreign 
public officials46 and represents the first multilateral agreement to 
criminalize bribery.47 The OECD Convention entered into force in 
 
 42.  See Robinson, supra note 9, at 314 (observing that, in recent years, the 
SEC and DOJ have widely enforced the FCPA against violations that affect or 
concern the United States). 
 43.  See Abiola Makinwa, The Rules Regulating Transnational Bribery 
Achieving a Common Standard?, 2007 INT’L BUS. L.J. 17, 18–19 (arguing that the 
FCPA is “the cornerstone upon which the . . . international anti-corruption 
framework has been built”). 
 44.  Id. at 26 (observing that of all anti-corruption instruments, the OECD 
Convention follows most closely the approach of the FCPA); White, supra note 5, 
at 163 (stating that the United States was very involved in the OECD Convention’s 
negotiations and gave important input to the administration throughout the 
negotiation process). 
 45.  Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: 
Global Achievement or Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191, 195–96 
(2005). 
 46.  See Robinson, supra note 9, at 306 (stating that the OECD Convention 
criminalizes the bribery of foreign public officials in international commercial 
transactions and requires parties to the Convention to: (1) adhere to the 
Convention’s interpretation of the “bribery of a foreign public officer,” (2) 
promote international cooperation, and (3) enforce the anticorruption legislation). 
 47.  See White, supra note 5, at 163 (recognizing that the OECD Convention 
was unprecedented in the way it criminalized bribery of foreign public officials, 
including payments to officials of public agencies, public enterprises, and public 
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1999.48 
The OECD Convention states, 
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that 
it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, 
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly 
or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or 
for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in 
relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain 
business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international 
business.49 
The OECD Convention defines a foreign official as “any person 
holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign 
country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public 
function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or 
public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international 
organisation.”50 
The monitoring mechanism of the OECD Convention has 
conducted extensive assessment of U.S. compliance under the 
FCPA.51 The results of such monitoring provide a thorough analysis 




 48.  E.g., Webb, supra note 45, at 195. 
 49.  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions and Related Documents, art. 1, May 23, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. 
 50.  Id. art. 1(4)(a).  
 51.  See Robinson, supra note 9, at 306 (describing how the OECD has 
incorporated compliance measures entailing annual peer-review monitoring, which 
evaluates the adequacy of a country’s legislation to implement the Convention, 
assesses whether a country is applying the legislation effectively, and focuses on 
enforcement of the Convention and any outstanding recommendations); see also 
Phase One Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the 
United States, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 1 (Apr. 1999), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/2390377.pdf 
[hereinafter OECD Phase One Report] (stating that the United States signed the 
OECD Convention on December 17, 1997, ratified it on November 10, 1998, and 
deposited its instrument of ratification with the OECD on December 8, 1998). 
 52.  See Bixby, supra note 6, at 100 (stating that upon the establishment of the 
OECD Convention, the United States amended the FCPA to properly align the 
FCPA with the OECD Convention). 
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The OECD Convention strives to use domestic law to combat the 
bribery of foreign public officials.53 An assessment of the United 
States’ compliance with its obligations under the UNCAC will 
demonstrate that the FCPA’s expansiveness—which is greater than 
that of the OECD Convention—is indicative of the FCPA’s 
increasing scope.54 
D. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: 
INTERPRETING THE UNCAC 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna 
Convention”)—which entered into force on January 27, 198055—
offers guidelines with which to interpret the UNCAC and the 
obligations it imposes. The increasing importance of treaties as a 
source of international law and as a means of developing peaceful 
cooperation among nations provided the impetus for a common 
standard to interpret all international treaties.56 Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention states, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”57 
An analysis of the FCPA under this provision will determine whether 
the FCPA fulfills the United States’ anti-bribery obligations under 
the UNCAC. 
 
 53.  See Webb, supra note 45, at 195–96 (discussing the importance of the 
OECD Convention as an innovative effort to guide the anticorruption activities of 
governments that influence the flow of most of the world’s investments, trades, 
and goods). 
 54.  See OECD Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 1 (stating that the newly 
amended FCPA is the domestic legislation used by the United States to fulfill the 
requirements of the OECD Convention); Phase Three Report on Implementing the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the United States, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. 27–28 (Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/anti-briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf [hereinafter 
OECD Phase Three Report] (noting that while it is unclear whether the scope of 
the FCPA definition of “foreign public official” includes a person exercising a 
public function for a public enterprise or applies in cases where a benefit is 
directed to a third party by a foreign official, U.S. courts and agencies are inclined 
to interpret the term expansively). 
 55.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, pmbl., May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 332–33 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. art. 31. 
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E. UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT 
Other nations have enacted FCPA-comparable anti-bribery 
legislation that prohibits bribery of foreign public officials, while 
simultaneously surpassing the FCPA by prohibiting private sector 
bribery as well: the United Kingdom is one such nation.58 The United 
Kingdom Bribery Act (“UK Bribery Act”) entered into force on July 
1, 2011.59 The UK Bribery Act criminalizes a wide spectrum of 
bribery, ranging from the bribery of a foreign official60 to the bribery 
of any other person without distinguishing between the public and 
private sector, stating: 
(1) A person (“P”) is guilty of an offence if . . . (a) P offers, promises or 
gives a financial or other advantage to another person, and (b) P intends 
the advantage – (i) to induce a person to perform improperly a relevant 
function or activity, or (ii) to reward a person for the improper 
performance of such a function or activity.61 
Additionally, the UK Bribery Act expands corporate liability for 
bribery in international business transactions by allocating liability to 
the corporation for the actions taken by an actor associated with the 
corporation. Section seven of the UK Bribery Act states, 
[a] relevant commercial organisation (“C”) is guilty of an offence under 
this section if a person (“A”) associated with C bribes another person 
intending—(a) to obtain or retain business for C, or (b) to obtain or retain 
 
 58.  See discussion infra Part III.C (comparing the UK Bribery Act and the 
FCPA). 
 59.  See Press Release, Ministry of Justice, UK Clamps Down on Corruption 
with New Bribery Act (Mar. 30, 2011), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-clamps-down-on-corruption-with-new-
bribery-act (asserting that the United Kingdom will reinforce its reputation as a 
leader in the global fight against corruption when the Bribery Act enters into force 
on July 1, 2011). 
 60.  Bribery Act § 6, c. 23 (2010) (stating that a person who bribes a foreign 
public official (“F”) is guilty of an offense if that person’s intention is to influence 
F in F’s capacity as a foreign public official). 
 61.  Id. § 1; see also Lee G. Dunst et al., Hot Off the Press: Resetting the 
Global Anti-Corruption Thermostat to the UK Bribery Act, 12 BUS. L. INT’L 257, 
278 (2011) (clarifying that the provision against private bribery differs from the 
provision against the bribery of a foreign public official by stating that “the 
financial advantage must induce the person to perform a relevant function or 
activity improperly or reward the person for such improper performance, or the 
payer must know or believe that accepting the advantage would itself constitute 
improper performance of the relevant function or activity”). 
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an advantage in the conduct of business for C.62 
This provision is not limited to the bribery of a foreign public 
official and could reach the overseas actions of foreign persons 
associated with a British company, thereby vastly widening the scope 
of the UK Bribery Act.63 
The extensive scope of the UK Bribery Act encompasses the 
offense of bribing another person, the offense of being bribed, and 
the organizational offense of failing to prevent bribery.64 The 
implementation of the UK Bribery Act has brought the United 
Kingdom into compliance with its international treaty obligations.65 
III. ANALYSIS 
This section first discusses the Vienna Convention as the standard 
under which to interpret the UNCAC. Second, this section asserts 
that the FCPA does not meet the UNCAC’s Article 21 anti-bribery 
provision through a textual interpretation of the respective 
documents and how they are, and are not, similar. This section will 
then consider the issue through a more theoretical approach, 
concluding that, in its application, the FCPA nears compliance in a 
limited capacity with UNCAC Article 21. Third, it argues that the 
antiquity of the FCPA prevents it from meeting the broader purpose 
of the UNCAC and compares the FCPA against the 2010 United 
Kingdom Bribery Act. Finally, this section assesses the UNCAC 
negotiations to determine their implications for the United States’ 
dogmatic perspective regarding anti-bribery legislation. 
 
 
 62.  Bribery Act § 7. 
 63.  See Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Note, Combating Foreign Bribery: Legislative 
Reform in the United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement, 
49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 365, 390 (2011) (expressing that the language of 
Section 7 of the UK Bribery Act “would potentially cover new actors and expand 
the scope of British jurisdiction beyond that envisioned by the American regime”).  
 64.  See Dunst et al., supra note 61, at 277 (setting forth the additional offenses 
proscribed by the UK Bribery Act in addition to the offense of bribing a foreign 
official). 
 65.  See Bonneau, supra note 63, at 400 (asserting that the UK Bribery Act is a 
vast improvement in British anti-bribery law, specifying that the addition of the 
offense for foreign bribery brings the United Kingdom into compliance with its 
international treaty obligations). 
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A. ANALYSIS OF THE UNCAC UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
In interpreting the UNCAC as it applies to the United States, the 
Vienna Convention dictates that the UNCAC be read in accordance 
with its ordinary meaning as well as the overall context and goals of 
the Convention.66 Although the United States is not an official 
signatory of the Vienna Convention, it considers the Vienna 
Convention instructive.67 Therefore, an assessment of the United 
States’ obligations under the UNCAC must go beyond the black-
letter text of the Convention and consider the purpose of the 
UNCAC.68  Both the UNCAC and the FCPA share a similar 
objective, to combat bribery; the text of the UNCAC, however, is 
more expansive than that of the FCPA.69 
B. ALTHOUGH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNCAC AND FCPA ARE 
COMPARABLE, THE UNCAC ACKNOWLEDGES ACTS OF BRIBERY 
THAT ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE FCPA 
The precedent of United States predominance in combating 
international bribery in commercial transactions is being replaced by 
 
 66.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 55, art. 31 (stating that not only must a 
treaty be interpreted in “good faith” and in conformance with its “ordinary 
meaning,” but it must be understood according to its purpose and context—which 
includes its preamble and annexes—as well as subsequent agreements and 
practices in application). 
 67.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited July 28, 2013) (stating 
that though the United States has not signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, it considers many of the provisions to constitute customary international 
law). 
 68.  See id. (requiring that the interpretation of a treaty must include any 
agreement and instrument made in connection with the creation of the treaty, 
before or after its conclusion, and that special meaning should be given to certain 
terms of the treaty if the parties so intended). 
 69.  See Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against 
Corruption, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 75, 80 (2006) (explaining that the UNCAC created a 
“global framework for combating corruption”); see also Barbara Crutchfield 
George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation: 
A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward the 
Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5 (1999) 
(affirming that the FCPA combats bribery by being the first legislation worldwide 
that criminalizes the bribery by business entities as opposed to criminalizing the 
acceptance of bribes by government officials). 
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the innovative progression of the international community.70 The 
primary objective of the FCPA when it was instituted as the United 
States’ primary mechanism for addressing the problem of 
international bribery was to combat illicit bribes made by United 
States firms to foreign officials.71 Alternatively, the UNCAC has 
created a new precedent for anti-bribery legislation by instigating the 
possibility of making bribery in the private sector a criminal 
offense.72 Although the UNCAC does not make the prohibition of 
private sector bribery mandatory—preventing the United States from 
being in violation of its UNCAC obligations—the provision remains 
important because its inclusion within the UNCAC contributes to the 
overall objective of the Convention and signals a shift in 
international law.73 Despite being non-mandatory, Article 21 will 
have significant implications for the future of the United States’ 
federal policy regarding bribery in international commercial 
transactions.74 
First, this section evaluates the plain meaning of the FCPA to 
determine whether, based solely on the Act’s language, the FCPA 
satisfies Article 16(1) and Article 21 of the UNCAC, respectively. 
Next, this section will take a theoretical approach, interpreting 
whether the application of the FCPA expands its scope to satisfy the 
 
 70.  See OECD Phase Three Report, supra note 54, at 50 (commending the 
U.S. government for its visible and high level of support for the fight against 
bribery of foreign officials); see also U.N. Pilot Review Programme, supra note 4, 
at 12 (stating that the FCPA is “reported to be a significant priority” for the DOJ); 
Robinson, supra note 9, at 314 (explaining that U.S. enforcement agencies have 
received praise for their frequent initiation of such international cooperation in 
deterring foreign bribery). 
 71.  See generally Bixby, supra note 6, at 93 (discussing the purpose and two 
primary provisions of the FCPA when it was first enacted). 
 72.  See Argandoña, supra note 15, at 7 (stating that the UNCAC has 
incorporated this possibility in Article 21). 
 73.  See UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 19 (mandating that “[e]ach State Party 
shall consider adopting” legislation prohibiting private sector bribery); Boswell, 
supra note 2, at 1166 (stating that the issue of corruption has become a priority in 
international law, politically and economically, because of a combination of 
interests regarding corruption in the public and private sectors in many countries); 
discussion infra Part III.D (discussing the emerging international consensus on the 
need to prohibit private sector bribery in international commercial transactions as 
illustrated by the UNCAC negotiations).  
 74.  See discussion infra Part III.B.2–3 (examining the way in which the U.S. 
policy regarding the use of the FCPA is already expanding beyond the scope of 
foreign public officials).  
  
2014] THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BRIBERY 733 
anti-bribery provisions of the UNCAC. Finally, after concluding that 
the FCPA fails to incorporate both anti-bribery provisions of the 
UNCAC, this section argues that the FCPA’s expansive scope, 
demonstrated by its application against public enterprises and 
resulting from the blurring lines between the private and public 
sectors, may indicate further compliance with the UNCAC than a 
textual reading might suggest. 
1. A Strictly Textual Assessment Reveals that the FCPA Does Not 
Prohibit the Full Scope of Bribery Addressed within the UNCAC 
The provision addressing bribery of foreign public officials within 
the UNCAC is based on the language of similar agreements that have 
come before it.75 This premise is illustrated by the comparable 
components of Article 16(1) and the FCPA.76 The scope of the FCPA 
encompasses the prohibitions of Article 16(1), thereby satisfying one 
aspect of the anti-bribery initiative the UNCAC seeks to address.77 
A prima facie comparison of the UNCAC Article 16(1) and the 
FCPA reveals the compatibility of the two provisions.78 First, both 
provisions require similar actions to constitute the offense of bribery 
of a foreign public official.79 Second, the requisite purposes of the 
 
 75.  See Indira Carr, The United Nations Convention on Corruption: Making a 
Real Difference to the Quality of Life of Millions?, 34 MANCHESTER J. INT’L 
ECON. L., no. 3, 2006, at 3, 20 (stating that this offense is found in Article 16 of the 
UNCAC and that, in drafting it, the UNCAC “mimic[ked] . . . the language found 
in other anti-corruption conventions”). 
 76.  See Makinwa, supra note 43, at 25 (asserting that transnational bribery 
rules have a number of elements in common). 
 77.  See U.N. Pilot Review Programme, supra note 4, at 12 (stating that the 
FCPA complies with UNCAC Article 16(1) by criminalizing the conduct described 
within Article 16(1)). 
 78.  See USA UNCAC Self-Assessment, supra note 4, at 16 (stating that the text 
of the FCPA sufficiently establishes the provisions of Article 16(1) as a criminal 
offense).  
 79.  Compare UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 16(1) (requiring an act of 
promising, offering, or giving to constitute bribery), and Brunelle-Quraishi, supra 
note 1, at 111 (stating that the UNCAC specifically criminalizes the “offering, 
giving, promising, acceptance, and solicitation of any ‘undue advantage’”), with 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (1998) 
(listing similar conduct, such as an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization 
of the payment of any money, as acts of bribery), and OECD Phase One Report, 
supra note 51, at 3 (asserting that the FCPA requirement to offer, promise, or give 
proof of an act in furtherance establishes that the defendant committed himself to 
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bribe in order to constitute an offense are comparable in both the 
FCPA and the UNCAC Article 16(1).80 Third, both provisions use 
the same language to identify the recipient of the bribe.81 While there 
exists some discrepancy in the language because of the UNCAC’s 
direct prohibition of the bribery of an official of a public 
international organization, the FCPA definition of a foreign official 
encompasses any officer or employee of a public international 
organization, thereby satisfying all elements of UNCAC Article 
16(1).82 Finally, both provisions include a safeguard, requiring intent 
in order for liability for the offense of bribery of a foreign public 
official to exist.83 A textual comparison of UNCAC Article 16(1) and 
the FCPA shows that the FCPA meets the obligations created by 
Article 16(1).84 
 
doing the act and thereafter performed some act to accomplish the objective).  
 80.  Compare UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 16(1) (requiring that the act of 
bribery by an official be to intentionally obtain or retain business or other undue 
advantage in relation to the conduct of international business, as long as the official 
acts or refrains from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties), and U.N. 
Pilot Review Programme, supra note 4, at 12, with 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A)–
(B) (necessitating that the purpose of the bribe be to influence a foreign official in 
his official capacity or to secure an undue advantage), and OECD Phase One 
Report, supra note 51, at 3 (stating that the two categories of improper benefits 
prohibited by the FCPA are the offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of 
the payment of any money and the offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of 
the giving of anything of value). 
 81.  Compare UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 16 (requiring the act of bribery to be 
directed at a “foreign public official or an official of a public international 
organization . . . for the official himself or herself or another person or entity”), 
with 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(1)–(3) (necessitating that these actions be directed to any 
foreign official, any foreign political party or official thereof, or any candidate for 
foreign political office, or other person, knowing that the payment to that other 
person would be passed on to a foreign official, foreign political party or official 
thereof or candidate for foreign political office).  
 82.  See OECD Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 6 (expanding on the 
definition of “foreign official” to include “any officer or employee of a ‘political 
international organization’” or a third person acting in an official capacity on 
behalf of such an organization). 
 83.  See UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 15 (stating that under provisions of the 
UNCAC, bribery is considered an offense when committed intentionally); 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (requiring the impetus for the bribe to be corruption); OECD 
Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 2 (clarifying that by requiring corrupt intent, 
the FCPA prohibits all payments to foreign officials “regardless of whether that 
official would have acted or not acted without the payment being made”). 
 84.  See U.N. Pilot Review Programme, supra note 4, at 13 (“The U.S. has 
adopted the measures required in accordance with UNCAC Article 16(1).”). 
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A surface reading of the FCPA indicates that the Act only 
prohibits bribery in the public sector and therefore does not address 
the private sector bribery restriction of UNCAC Article 21.85 The 
FCPA’s limited provisions distinguish it from the UNCAC, which 
criminalizes bribery in the private sector in addition to the public 
sector.86 In contrast to Article 16(1), Article 21 prohibits the bribery 
of any person and does not require association with a foreign public 
official to establish liability.87 Conversely, the FCPA does not 
recognize the bribery of just any person as an offense.88 Thus, a 
strictly textual reading of the FCPA prompts the conclusion that the 
FCPA does not fulfill both tenets of the UNCAC’s anti-bribery 
regime. 
2. The Application of the FCPA Implies that the FCPA Nearly 
Encompasses the Form of Bribery Recognized by Article 21, yet 
Fails to Fully Incorporate the Actions Prohibited by  
UNCAC Article 21 
The application of the FCPA indicates that the doctrine has a 
wider scope than its language would suggest. The FCPA’s original 
purpose was to address bribery of foreign officials, completely 
satisfying the UNCAC’s Article 16 prohibition against the bribery of 
foreign public officials.89 While the U.S. government did not enact 
the FCPA with the intent to address bribery in the private sector, the 
increasing global attention towards private sector bribery has 
corresponded with the broadening scope of the FCPA.90 
 
 85.  See Bixby, supra note 6, at 94 (stating that the anti-bribery provisions of 
the FCPA are meant to deter corporations from using bribery to influence their 
business with officials of foreign nations). 
 86.  See UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 21 (prohibiting bribery in the private 
sector by making it a criminal offense). 
 87.  See id. art. 21(a) (criminalizing the promise, offering, soliciting or 
acceptance, or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage to any person). 
 88.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)–(3) (prohibiting the direct or indirect bribery 
of a foreign official or foreign political party). 
 89.  See Robinson, supra note 9, at 311 (listing Congress’ purposes for 
enacting the FCPA as “to prohibit bribery of foreign officials and to promote fair 
business practices, integrity, and accountability and the efficient and equitable 
distribution of economic resources”).  
 90.  See id. at 310 (reporting that in 2011 the Bribe Index looked at business-
to-business bribery for the first time and found that companies are almost as likely 
to pay bribes to other businesses as they are to public officials).  
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The DOJ and SEC have exaggerated extensively the already-
expansive view of the FCPA’s requisite elements in recent FCPA 
actions.91 The FCPA has consistently been applied extraterritorially, 
provided that the act in question triggers further acts to occur in the 
United States.92 Additionally, an expansive aspect of the FCPA is 
that it prohibits the offer of a bribe; therefore, no affirmative action is 
needed to violate the FCPA.93 In the last few years, however, the 
interpretation of the FCPA has become significantly more 
extensive.94 The conclusion of the most recent OECD Phase Report 
underscores this expansion, explaining that the FCPA has become 
broader than the purely “anti-bribery directed towards public foreign 
official” scope of the OECD Convention because the FCPA has been 
used against persons not considered public officials under the OECD 
Convention.95 The recent evolution of the applicability of the FCPA, 
expanding the scope of the Act, has signaled stronger U.S. 
conformity with UNCAC Article 21’s prohibition of private sector 
bribery.96 
The FCPA does not have a clearly defined boundary; rather, the 
FCPA can be interpreted to have a narrow scope that only applies to 
payments that are made in order to obtain a foreign official’s 
 
 91.  See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 530 (stating that although the DOJ and 
SEC typically have taken a very broad view of the provisions of the FCPA in the 
past, the enforcement agencies have become even more expansive in their 
interpretation of the FCPA recently). 
 92.  See Carolyn Lindsey, More than you Bargained For: Successor Liability 
Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 959, 962 
(discussing the far-reaching jurisdiction of the FCPA, in that “arguably the 
authorization of a wire transfer intended to pay a bribe that hits a U.S. bank 
account is enough to put a foreign company under the territorial jurisdiction of the 
FCPA”). 
 93.  See id. (arguing that money or a gift does not actually need to change 
hands to constitute a bribe in violation of the FCPA, and that just an offer suffices 
as a violation). 
 94.  See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 530 (discussing how the expansion of 
FCPA enforcement has gone as far as the SEC using FCPA authority to apply 
existing laws in “novel and creative ways,” consequently “broadening the scope of 
liability for the regulated community,” which some consider “hyper aggressive”). 
 95.  See OECD Phase Three, supra note 54, at 27 (stating that whether the 
FCPA covers a person exercising a public function for a foreign country or a 
public enterprise must be determined in order to clarify the definition of a foreign 
public official). 
 96.  See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 494 (asserting that the “relatively recent 
radicalization” of FCPA enforcement has changed the substance of the law). 
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approval regarding international business transactions.97 However, a 
broader reading of the FCPA, to cover payments that indirectly help 
the person offering the bribe to obtain or retain foreign business, 
provides a more accurate interpretation.98 The FCPA continuously 
has received liberal application, largely by attributing a pliable 
definition to the term “foreign official” as the instrument of evolution 
towards the FCPA’s application in the private sector and, 
consequently, compliance with UNCAC Article 21.99 
The primary method of expanding the application of the FCPA to 
bribery in the private sector as encompassed by UNCAC Article 21 
is the increasing use of the FCPA against public enterprises.100 The 
term “instrumentality” within the definition of a public official has 
been interpreted broadly to bring public enterprises within the 
purview of the FCPA.101 The inclusion of public enterprises within 
the scope of the FCPA illustrates U.S. deference to UNCAC Article 
21 by bringing entities not directly employed by the government 
within the jurisdiction of the FCPA.102 The United States justifies the 
 
 97.  Makinwa, supra note 43, at 19. 
 98.  See id. at 19 (suggesting that the most likely result of the debate regarding 
the scope of the FCPA, caused by the somewhat ambiguous language of the act, is 
that the act should be widely interpreted); see also Bixby, supra note 6, at 100–01 
(stating that the 1998 amendment of the FCPA significantly expanded the reach of 
the act by including “any individual who could be considered an agent of a 
corporation or any official, regardless of governmental level, in a foreign nation” 
under the purview of the FCPA). 
 99.  See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 531 (suggesting that the definition of a 
“foreign official” as used in the FCPA is arguably “the most contentious point of 
FCPA interpretation”). 
 100.  See OECD Phase Three Report, supra note 54, at 28 (stating that since the 
last Report there have been positive legal developments regarding the application 
of the FCPA against the bribery of a person exercising a public function for a 
public enterprise). 
 101.  See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 533 (stating that the DOJ has regularly 
indicated that it takes a more expansive view of the “agency or instrumentality” 
component of the FCPA to encompass quasi-governmental bodies and 
consideration of the “role performed by the entity or the government’s influence”). 
 102.  Compare OECD Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 6 (noting that the 
FCPA’s definition of foreign official does not reference public enterprises, nor are 
public enterprises mentioned in the act itself), and OECD Phase Three Report, 
supra note 54, at 28 (identifying the lack of official determination as to whether 
the definition of a foreign public official covers a person exercising a public 
function for a foreign country, including for a public enterprise), with OECD 
Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 6 (explaining that public enterprises 
incorporate employees of instrumentalities of foreign governments as being 
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inclusion of public enterprises by asserting that Congress expressly 
intended to include state-owned enterprises and the employees of 
those enterprises in the definition of a foreign official.103 The 
expansive amount of businesses now considered foreign officials due 
to the interpretation of the term “instrumentality” resembles the 
prohibition of private bribery in UNCAC Article 21 because 
transactions between businesses exercising primarily private 
functions are now susceptible to FCPA enforcement.104 
The second significant factor behind the expansion towards FCPA 
application in the private sector is the blurring of the line between the 
two sectors.105 Many countries have seen increasing government 
involvement within the alleged private sector for various reasons, 
such as the nature of the respective governments or in response to a 
need generated by the current state of the economy.106 The resulting 
 
foreign officials and that this provision covers officers, directors, and employees of 
state enterprises), and Westbrook, supra note 5, at 535 (stating that the term 
“instrumentality” has been interpreted to include state-owned or controlled 
enterprises, making employees of such enterprises foreign officials for the 
purposes of the FCPA). 
 103.  OECD Phase Three Report, supra note 54, at 28. 
 104.  See OECD Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 6 (discussing the factors 
the DOJ considers in categorizing an entity as a public enterprise, including the 
characterization of the enterprise and its employees, “the purpose of the 
enterprise,” and “the degree of control exercised over the enterprise by the foreign 
government;” the DOJ has qualified a vast amount of businesses, and consequently 
their employees, as being controlled or owned by foreign governments, resulting in 
their treatment as instrumentalities of the foreign government). But see Kubiciel, 
supra note 8, at 151 (stating that the UNCAC’s goal of broad criminalization is 
accomplished through including “both public officials by statute and those by 
function” in its definition of a foreign public official); Brunelle-Quraishi, supra 
note 1, at 112 (explaining that the concept of a foreign official as used by the 
UNCAC encompasses a wide array of categories and that the interpretation of a 
foreign official under the UNCAC will be left to the discretion of each Member 
State). 
 105.  See Webb, supra note 45, at 212 (declaring that a reason behind the global 
recognition of the problem of private sector corruption is the line between the 
public and private sector being blurred by privatization and outsourcing); Brunelle-
Quraishi, supra note 1, at 109 (explaining that regional instruments have begun 
including private sector corruption because the line between the public and private 
sector is becoming increasingly blurred, accrediting this trend to outsourcing and 
the rapid growth of the private sector in some countries); Babu, supra note 3, at 18 
(affirming that the line between the two sectors is blurred by privatization, 
outsourcing and other developments). 
 106.  For example, due to the pervasive presence of the Chinese government in 
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vulnerability of entities outside the traditional concept of a public 
foreign official, as represented by UNCAC Article 16(1), to FCPA 
litigation brings the FCPA closer to accommodating the private 
bribery provision of UNCAC Article 21 but ultimately fails to fully 
incorporate the provision.107 
3. The Extensive Scope of the FCPA Is Illustrated by Case Law 
Recent cases demonstrate how the FCPA has expanded in a way 
that implies a growing U.S. conformity with the larger scope of anti-
bribery objectives of the UNCAC, manifested by Article 21. In 2008, 
Nam Quoc Nguyen pled guilty to violating the FCPA by bribing 
employees of a Vietnamese government-owned company.108 Nguyen 
was the founder and President of Nexus Technologies, which 
exported a wide variety of equipment and technology to its 
customers in Vietnam.109 The company obtained business by paying 
bribes to rig bids and receive confidential information.110 For 
purposes of the FCPA, the bribes were being paid to foreign officials 
because Vietnamese government agencies controlled Nexus 
 
the private sector, entities of the socialized medical system—including nurses, lab 
technicians, and family members of employees—have been considered foreign 
officials. Additionally, the global stimulus plan has resulted in the categorization 
of many large companies as foreign officials for the purposes of the FCPA due to 
governmental assistance, such as the Royal Bank of Scotland, which is now 68.4% 
owned by the UK government. Furthermore, the rise in cross-border investments—
many governmentally-controlled—in companies during the economic crises will 
result in the inclusion of those companies within the FCPA definition of foreign 
officials, such as the Singapore Investment Corporation, which is now closely 
connected with the Singaporean government. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 534–
35 (stating that recent cases have exhibited an unprecedented expansion of the 
definition of foreign official).  
 107.  See Bixby, supra note 6, at 91 (noting that “whenever U.S. business 
crosses a border, an FCPA investigation is now a distinct possibility”). 
 108.  E.g., Guilty Plea Agreement at 1–2, United States v.  Nguyen, No. 08-522-
1 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2009) (stating the specific charges to which the defendant, 
Nam Quoc Nguyen, was pleading guilty). 
 109.  See Indictment at 2, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-522-1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
4, 2008) (specifying that the company exported underwater mapping equipment, 
bomb containment equipment, helicopter parts, chemical detectors, satellite 
communication parts, and air tracking systems). 
 110.  See id. at 6 (explaining that the manner and means of the conspiracy 
included the defendant paying bribes to a Hong Kong Company which then 
funneled the funds to Vietnamese government officials as a way to obtain lucrative 
contracts). 
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Technology customers.111 
This case reflects a shift towards a more expansive interpretation 
of the FCPA, nearing the incorporation of Article 21 of the UNCAC, 
because the U.S. government held companies and their employees 
exercising private functions liable under the FCPA.112 The United 
States justifies this expansion by asserting that a public purpose is 
only one of many factors used to determine if an organization is an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign government and claiming that 
Congress intended to include employees of state-owned enterprises 
in the definition of a foreign official.113 The U.S. government’s 
rationalization of the use of the FCPA, although an unprecedented 
expansion of its scope, implicitly acknowledges that a doctrine 
focused solely on public officials will no longer adequately deter 
bribery in international business transactions.114 While U.S. v. Nam 
Quoc Nguyen reflects a positive United States policy shift towards 
addressing bribery in the private sector, this shift leaves many 
unsuspecting companies vulnerable to litigation due to the 
unprecedented expansion of FCPA application.115 
Another example of an FCPA case that illustrates the FCPA’s 
 
 111.  See id. at 3–4 (discussing the various government entities involved: Vung 
Tau Airport and Southern Flight Management Center, controlled by the Ministry of 
Transport; Viestovpetro Joint Venture and Petro Vietnam Gas Company, 
controlled by the Ministry of Industry; and Tourism and Trading Company, 
controlled by Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Safety. The Hong Kong Company was 
used to facilitate the payments of bribes to and for the benefit of Vietnamese 
government officials; therefore, these companies and their employees were 
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of the Government of Vietnam and, 
consequently, foreign officials). 
 112.  See OECD Phase Three Report, supra note 54, at 28 (stating that the 
defendants argued that they could not be held liable under the FCPA because the 
definition of a foreign official does not include employees of a state owned 
enterprise and that for an organization to be considered an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign government, it must serve a “purely public purpose”). 
 113.  See id. (discussing the response of the U.S. government to the defendants’ 
argument, rationalizing the extension of the definition of an agency or 
instrumentality in order for the FCPA to apply to the claim). 
 114.  See id. (presenting the United States’ response to the defendants’ 
challenges against the use of the FCPA when involving employees of state-owned 
enterprises in the case of Nam Quoc Nguyen). 
 115.  See Indictment, supra note 109, at 6 (stating that defendants paid bribes to 
Vietnamese “government officials,” referring to agents of companies owned in part 
by the Vietnamese government). 
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expansion into the private sector is U.S. v. Kellogg Brown & Root. In 
2009, Kellogg Brown & Root (“KBR”) pled guilty to conspiring to 
violate the FCPA.116 KBR executives allegedly bribed Nigeria LNG 
Limited (“NLNG”), a company created to develop the Bonny Island 
Project and award all related contracts.117 The Nigerian government 
controlled forty-nine percent of NLNG.118 This case is significant 
because it demonstrates the increasing use of the FCPA within 
largely non-governmental businesses sectors. Though the 
government was not a dominating influence over NLNG, it owned 
the entity that controlled a portion of NLNG shares.119 There existed 
minimal government involvement in both U.S. v. Kellogg Brown & 
Root and U.S. v. Nam Quoc Nguyen, indicating a shift in the 
application of the FCPA towards the private sector and addressing 
the actions prohibited by Article 21 of the UNCAC.120 
C. IMPLICATION OF THE UNCAC: THE FCPA IS AN ANTIQUATED 
DOCUMENT, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY 
ACT 
The globalized nature of today’s market enhances the potential for 
corruption and bribery.121 Additionally, the increasing prevalence of 
 
 116.  See Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, 
No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009) (stating that the defendant agreed to waive 
indictment and plead guilty to a five count criminal information); Bixby, supra 
note 6, at 131 (explaining that Kellogg Brown & Root pleaded guilty to one count 
of conspiring to violate the FCPA and four counts of violating the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA); Information at 9, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root 
LLC, No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2009) (reporting that count one is the 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA). 
 117.  Plea Agreement, supra note 116, at 39. 
 118.  See id. at 38–39 (describing that the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation was a Nigerian government-owned company and was the largest 
shareholder of NLNG; the U.S. government alleged that the Nigerian government 
controlled NLNG through appointment of board members). 
 119.  See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 533 (affirming that a Nigerian 
government-owned entity owned forty-nine percent of NLNG). 
 120.  See Plea Agreement, supra note 116, at 7–9 (explaining that KBR 
participated in a scheme to bribe employees of NLNG, a company whose largest 
shareholder at forty-nine percent is a government-owned corporation); Indictment, 
supra note 109, at 3–6 (communicating that the defendant is charged with bribing 
employees of companies over which the Vietnamese government exercised 
control). 
 121.  See George et al., supra note 69, at 25 (discussing how “in today’s world, 
goods, ideas and capital move across national borders with ease” and nations at 
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government intervention in the economy correlates with increasing 
occurrences of corrupt business practices.122 This trend of corrupt 
business practices propagates the belief that bribery is an inevitable 
aspect of doing business.123 Because the nature of today’s economy 
makes it beneficial for corporations to engage in corrupt business 
practices, multilateral conventions such as the UNCAC are needed to 
counteract the norm of corruption.124 As an accepted aspect of 
international business for many years, bribery has caused negative 
repercussions spanning various industries.125 
The United States was the first country to recognize international 
corruption as harmful;126 today, it is widely recognized that the 
negative consequences of corruption, such as distorting markets, 
breeding cynicism among citizens, and undermining the rule of law, 
must be prevented and corruption eliminated.127 The international 
community as a whole must resist bribery in international business 
transactions, though the practice remains deeply rooted in the very 
nature of the market.128 While corruption in general always impedes 
 
varying stages of development are interacting with each other to foster an 
environment of corruption); Vlassis, supra note 15, at 126 (stating that the 
“problem of corruption is systematic rather than individual” and that in today’s 
economy, since “only a very small number of companies are practically able to 
carry out the work, the ground is fertile for corrupt practices”). 
 122.  Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across 
Borders, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 413, 421 (2007) (stating that theorists have suggested 
that “where government intervention in the economy is high, the scope of 
corruption increases”). 
 123.  See id. at 423 (explaining that businesses located in developing countries 
are more likely to contribute to the spread of corruption “by assuming pay-offs and 
connections are inevitable facts of doing business”).  
 124.  See Babu, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing how the system of international 
trade was conducive to corruption, the practice being seen as “quite normal and 
legal” in most countries). 
 125.  See id. at 1 (suggesting that international corruption not only impedes the 
government’s ability to provide services to its citizens, but also jeopardizes the 
development of a country). 
 126.  See George et al., supra note 69, at 3–4 (indicating that the FCPA was the 
first of its kind in the realm of international bribery law).  
 127.  Heineman & Heimann, supra note 69, at 76. 
 128.  See Vlassis, supra note 15, at 126 (positing that bribery has detrimental 
effects in both developing and developed countries); George et al., supra note 69, 
at 9 (stating that the shifting attitude towards international corruption in business 
has been caused, in part, by an awareness “brought about by the globalization of 
business and security transactions, that the economic costs of corruption are too 
high”). 
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economic development, private sector bribery specifically is 
problematic and must be monitored.129 Therefore, a multilateral 
agreement such as the UNCAC is crucial in the movement to deter 
bribery in international business transactions;130  in order to impart 
the changes necessary to cure the deficiencies caused by bribery, 
however, the UNCAC must be fully supported by all of its 
signatories. 
United States federal law will not encompass the full scope of the 
UNCAC anti-bribery provisions until the United States shares in the 
goals of the Convention.131 Globalization has created problems that 
must be addressed on a supranational, rather than national, scale, 
leading to varying values on private sector bribery.132 The increasing 
reliance on multilateral treaty instruments for addressing serious 
international problems will not motivate the United States to alter the 
FCPA to satisfy the anti-bribery criminalization provisions of the 
UNCAC as long as the United States refuses to take a global 
approach to the criminalization of bribery.133 
The United States commitment to the FCPA restricts the United 
States from accepting and implementing international treaty 
 
 129.  See Boswell, supra note 2, at 1165–66 (suggesting that the costs of 
corruption go beyond the common capital loss, namely, undermining democracy, 
threatening effective development, and jeopardizing free market values); Rohlfsen, 
supra note 2, at 152–53 (listing several repercussions of corruption); UNCAC, 
supra note 11, pmbl. (stating “that corruption is no longer a local matter but a 
transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making 
international co-operation to prevent and control it essential”). 
 130.  See generally Babu, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that in recent years, since 
corruption in international business transactions has begun receiving global 
attention, there has been an unprecedented effort to adopt international anti-
corruption instruments within a relatively short period of time). 
 131.  See Webb, supra note 45, at 226 (suggesting that the UNCAC will be 
successful when its signatories share its values). 
 132.  See Delaney, supra note 122, at 423 (citing Anne-Marie Slaughter’s 
suggestion that although “globalization has brought about a raft of problems that 
can only be addressed on a global scale” there is still resistance against the attempt 
to locate power above the state); see also Heineman & Heimann, supra note 69, at 
82 (stating that although it is a difficult task, the importance of creating a 
worldwide anticorruption framework justifies the efforts). 
 133.  See generally Shirley V. Scott, The Political Interpretation of Multilateral 
Treaties: Reconciling Text with Political Reality, 5 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 103, 
104 (2007) (“The international community has come to rely on the multilateral 
treaty instrument for addressing some of its most serious problems.”). 
  
744 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:3 
provisions that are clearly beyond the boundary of the original goals 
of the FCPA, such as private-to-private bribery.134 As the first Act to 
criminalize bribery in international commercial transactions, the 
FCPA proved an influential factor in establishing the structure of 
subsequent multilateral anti-bribery agreements.135 Given the 
FCPA’s history of influence, the United States is reluctant to 
acknowledge its inadequacies and cede its influence in favor of a 
more global perspective.136 The FCPA cannot satisfy the bribery 
provisions of the UNCAC. Furthermore, the U.S. government’s 
commitment to the original conception of the FCPA prevents the 
FCPA from becoming the modern domestic legislation needed by the 
United States to satisfy the anti-bribery obligations of the UNCAC.137 
Due to the United States’ refusal to allow the FCPA to progress 
enough to meet modern requirements—such as the need to address 
private sector bribery—the FCPA does not fully meet the standard 
set by the UNCAC anti-bribery provisions.138 
The United Kingdom, in order to update its anti-bribery regime, 
has passed the UK Bribery Act.139 The UK Bribery Act is the United 
Kingdom’s effort to stay abreast of international developments 
regarding corruption in international business transactions.140 In 
 
 134.  See Heineman & Heimann, supra note 69, at 85 (suggesting that each 
country will have to overcome its long-standing internal cultural problems in order 
to improve the enforcement of its anticorruption legislation and make the global 
anticorruption movement more likely to succeed). 
 135.  See George et al., supra note 69, at 18 (arguing that the FCPA has served 
as an important model for other multilateral organizations and nations in creating 
their own anticorruption laws). 
 136.  See Robinson, supra note 9, at 305 (describing the FCPA as the very first 
national legislation targeting international corruption and explaining how the 
FCPA has had global influence). 
 137.  See Webb, supra note 45, at 222–23 (theorizing that governments comply 
with treaties because they are committed to the ideas embodied in the treaty, not 
because they expect a reward for their compliance). 
 138.  See id. at 213 (stating that the United States resisted the desire of the 
European Union, Latin America, and the Caribbean during the UNCAC 
negotiations to incorporate a provision criminalizing private sector bribery). 
 139.  Bonneau, supra note 63, at 384 (observing that, in response to 
international criticism and in recognition of its confusing and outdated anti-bribery 
regime, the British government launched a complete legislative overhaul which 
ultimately resulted in the UK Bribery Act). 
 140.  See Dunst et al., supra note 61, at 261–62 (stating that the Bribery Act is 
the latest anti-corruption legislation attempting to comply with the globalized 
standard). 
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updating its legislation, the United Kingdom has gone further than 
the FCPA, reaching a wider range of corrupt conduct.141 
The nature and purpose of the UK Bribery Act, being parallel to 
that of the FCPA, lends itself to a comparison with the FCPA.142 
While comparable to the FCPA in certain respects, the UK Bribery 
Act reflects the growing trend to move beyond the FCPA in favor of 
implementing more comprehensive anti-bribery legislation.143 The 
UK Bribery Act has created new theories of liability for the 
international criminalization of foreign bribery.144 
The UK Bribery Act criminalizes the bribery of foreign officials, 
as the FCPA does.145 The language of the provision is reflective of 
the FCPA, as both require the same elements for the offense of 
bribery of a foreign official.146 The UK Bribery Act is more 
comprehensive than the FCPA, however, due to its broader scope 
and its encompassing of the criminalization of purely private-to-
private bribery.147 The UK Bribery Act surpasses its American 
counterpart by prohibiting private bribery between businessmen that 
occurs both domestically and overseas.148 
 
 141.  See Bonneau, supra note 63, at 388–89 (discussing the uncertainty 
surrounding the UK Bribery Act and its application since it reaches more conduct 
than the FCPA).  
 142.  See id. at 386 (asserting that the Bribery Act is an example of the export of 
the FCPA model abroad); Dunst et al., supra note 61, at 278 (stating that the 
Bribery Act, unlike the FCPA, “extends its reach to bribes made in the private 
sector, both domestically and abroad”). 
 143.  See Bonneau, supra note 63, at 395 (arguing that the United State’s FCPA 
had long been a model for international criminalization of foreign bribery, but that 
some countries like the United Kingdom have begun to move beyond the FCPA).  
 144.  See id. at 395–96 (stating that the United Kingdom’s anti-bribery laws 
create new theories of liability). 
 145.  See Dunst et al., supra note 61, at 263 (stating that the Bribery Act’s 
provision against bribing foreign officials provides a direct analogue to the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions); Bonneau, supra note 63, at 386 (observing that 
the Bribery Act established a discrete offense of bribery of foreign public 
officials). 
 146.  Bonneau, supra note 63, at 386 (showing that the UK Bribery Act lists the 
elements established by the FCPA for the offense of bribery of a foreign public 
official). 
 147.  See id. at 391 (suggesting that the UK Bribery Act represents a more 
comprehensive approach to the prevention of bribery than the FCPA and also may 
extend the British extraterritorial jurisdictional reach beyond that of the FCPA). 
 148.  See id. (stating that the Bribery Act extends jurisdiction and criminalizes 
bribery outside of the foreign official context). 
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The UK Bribery Act serves as an example that anti-bribery 
provisions can encompass both public and private sector bribery. 
Conversely, the UK Bribery Act has received criticism for its 
ambiguous language, a criticism shared by the FCPA.149 In an effort 
to clarify the ambiguity, the Ministry of Justice released guidelines 
that have, in effect, undermined the innovative features of the UK 
Bribery Act by suggesting that it will not be strictly enforced.150 The 
ultimate effects of the UK Bribery Act are yet to be seen; regardless 
of its limits, however, by including a provision addressing private 
sector bribery, the UK Bribery Act marks advancement in anti-
bribery legislation yet to be reached by the United States.151 These 
differences will ultimately affect the impact of the UK Bribery 
Act.152 A comparison between the UK Bribery Act and the FCPA 
demonstrates the inability of the FCPA to apply fully in the private 
sector without the inclusion of language targeted at strictly-private 
sector bribery, thus definitively restricting United States 
incorporation of the UNCAC private sector bribery prohibitions of 
Article 21.153 
D. THE NEGOTIATION OF THE UNCAC SIGNALS THE UNITED 
STATES’ UNWILLINGNESS TO STRAY FROM THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
FCPA, THEREBY PREVENTING FULL INCORPORATION OF THE 
SCOPE OF THE UNCAC ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS 
Including a provision against bribery in the private sector proved 
one of the most contentious issues during the UNCAC 
 
 149.  See id. at 401 (asserting that the UK Bribery Act has the “same problem 
with ambiguity” as the FCPA). 
 150.  See id. at 403 (suggesting that, in an attempt to respond to the fears of 
British corporations that they would be subjected to “draconian enforcement” of 
the new Bribery Act, these guidelines make clear that the act was not designed to 
“bring the full force of criminal law to bear upon well run commercial 
organisations that experience an isolated incident of bribery on their behalf”).  
 151.  See Dunst et al., supra note 61, at 262 (conveying that the UK Bribery Act, 
in addition to outlawing bribery of foreign public officials, features much broader 
anti-bribery restrictions than the FCPA—namely, extending liability to bribes 
perpetrated in a private, commercial setting).  
 152.  See id. (predicting that the UK Bribery Act’s impact on multinational 
corporations will largely depend on how the Act differs from the FCPA, which is 
the incumbent anti-corruption regime for the multinational corporate community).  
 153.  See Bribery Act § 1, c. 23 (2010)  (criminalizing private sector bribery by 
including a provision specifically prohibiting the bribery of “another person”). 
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negotiations.154 The strong desire of the European Union (“EU”) and 
the Latin American and Caribbean States to criminalize bribery in 
the private sector was met with staunch objections from the United 
States.155 The concern that limiting the scope of the Convention 
would adversely affect its implementation did not deter the United 
States from protesting the inclusion of a provision that, textually, was 
blatantly different from the FCPA.156 
The lack of U.S. domestic legislation addressing the issue of 
purely private sector bribery, though an issue of global concern, 
prevented the United States from supporting the provision.157 The 
United States’ opposition to what is now Article 21 appeared 
contradictory to its previous leading role in promoting the 
establishment of multilateral anti-bribery agreements.158 The United 
States claimed that a provision criminalizing purely private sector 
bribery could put United States citizens at risk for lawsuits in foreign 
courts and therefore would not be supported by the United States.159 
The United States’ protection of the private sector leaves no room for 
advancement beyond the confines of the public foreign officials 
language of the FCPA.160 The dogmatic approach taken by the 
 
 154.  Webb, supra note 45, at 213. 
 155.  See id. at 213 (stating that the EU led the campaign to criminalize bribery 
in the private sector and was supported by the Latin American and Caribbean 
States); Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 115. 
 156.  See Webb, supra note 45, at 213 (stating that during the negotiations, the 
representatives in support of including private sector bribery in the convention 
argued that adopting a limited approach that only targeted the public sector would 
“adversely affect the implementation of the future convention”). 
 157.  See id. (stating that, in opposing the inclusion of the prohibition of private 
sector bribery, the U.S. representative explained that private sector bribery was not 
a crime in the United States); Babu, supra note 3, at 31 (asserting that while the 
text of the UNCAC makes it clear that private sector corruption is a major global 
concern, the provision on corruption in purely private conducts was “watered-
down” in order to obtain passage). 
 158.  See Webb, supra note 45, at 213 (observing that the United States’ 
position is surprising given that the United States was the leader in the movement 
against international bribery). 
 159.  See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 115 (arguing that the United States 
forcefully opposed a provision that criminalized bribery in purely private contexts 
because it feared the potential ramifications of lawsuits against U.S. citizens in 
foreign courts).  
 160.  See Babu, supra note 3, at 31 (suggesting that, because of the protective 
approach taken by the developed countries towards the private sector, the provision 
on criminalizing purely private conduct was made non-mandatory in order to 
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United States towards the FCPA limits the United States’ ability to 
implement progressive provisions of multilateral agreements that 
recognize the need to prohibit bribery outside of the realm of public 
foreign officials.161 
The disagreements during the negotiations, which reached no 
consensus, indicate the improbability of U.S. federal law fully 
encompassing the UNCAC’s anti-bribery provisions.162 In order to 
settle this dispute, the parties reached a compromise that 
incorporated a provision criminalizing private sector bribery within 
the UNCAC, made non-mandatory to appease the United States.163 
The United States will not satisfy the non-mandatory provision 
criminalizing private sector bribery until it is willing to alter its 
domestic legislation. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Many experts agree that bribery “remains a routine business 
practice for too many companies and runs throughout their business 
dealings, not just those with public officials.”164 UNCAC Article 21 
has acknowledged and codified the emerging problem of bribery in 
the private sector.165 The FCPA, however, fails to fully address the 
prohibitions of Article 21; therefore, the United States must take 
additional measures to incorporate the complete set of UNCAC anti-
 
increase the chance of passage). 
 161.  See Webb, supra note 45, at 213–14 (stating that the FCPA only applies to 
bribes paid abroad in private-to-public contexts rather than private-to-private 
transactions). 
 162.  See Vlassis, supra note 15, at 129 (arguing that for a provision of a 
multilateral agreement to be effective, the international community must sustain 
efforts to attain consensus).  
 163.  See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 115 (reiterating that, due to the 
disagreement over private sector bribery, a compromise was struck that 
criminalized private-to-private corruption; however, the provision was not made 
mandatory); Webb, supra note 45, at 214 (stating that U.S. views ultimately 
prevailed, given that the provision on criminalizing bribery in the private sector 
was made non-mandatory).  
 164.  Robinson, supra note 9, at 321–22 (quoting Huguette Labelle, the Chair of 
the Board of Directors of Transparency International). 
 165.  See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 109 (discussing the inclusion of 
private sector bribery prohibitions in the UNCAC and asserting that the similarity 
of the public and private sector prohibitions reflect the “gradual convergence of 
both sectors”). 
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bribery provisions. The domestic legislation of any UNCAC 
signatory should criminalize bribery in order to comply fully with 
UNCAC Article 21.166 
A. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD AMEND ITS LEGISLATION 
The United States can take various measures to address its failure 
to incorporate the anti-bribery prohibition of UNCAC Article 21 
within federal legislation. One option is to incorporate compliance 
with the UNCAC through the FCPA. U.S. enforcement agencies 
could further extend the application of the FCPA and apply the Act 
within the purely-private sector.167 An updated set of guidelines, 
which would serve to notify businesses that the FCPA will apply in 
an extended amount of circumstances, would allow businesses to 
implement internal procedures to avoid potential FCPA actions. 
Additionally, the United States could amend the FCPA to formally 
expand its scope and make it applicable to private sector bribery.168 
The FCPA previously has been amended in order to adjust to 
contemporary standards.169 Amending the FCPA in response to the 
increasing global concern regarding private sector bribery would not 
represent a drastic shift away from FCPA precedent.170 
B. THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD MAKE CHANGES TO THE 
UNCAC TO INCREASE COMPLIANCE WITH ITS BRIBERY 
PROVISIONS 
The UNCAC also could compel United States’ compliance with 
its anti-bribery provisions by making Article 21 mandatory or 
 
 166.  UNCAC, supra note 11, at 19 (articulating that each state party shall 
consider criminalizing bribery in the private sector). 
 167.  See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 494–95 (suggesting that the scope of the 
FCPA has already expanded to some extent through enforcement).  
 168.  See id. at 502 (discussing how FCPA amendments have twice been utilized 
to clarify and strengthen the FCPA’s provisions). 
 169.  See Bixby, supra note 6, at 97–98 (discussing the origins of the 1998 
amendment and explaining that in 1977 when the FCPA was first enacted the 
United States was the only country with such a prohibition, though as time went on 
the world economy and the international attitude towards corruption changed, 
prompting the FCPA to adapt). 
 170.  See generally Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 109 (arguing that, given 
the growth of the private sector in some countries and the growing influence of 
multinational corporations, “it would have been negligent to refuse to criminalize 
corruption in both sectors”). 
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enforcing sanctions on noncompliance. By making Article 21 non-
mandatory, signatories such as the United States are less likely to 
implement those prohibitions into domestic law.171 By failing to 
incorporate a standard level of compliance obligations throughout the 
UNCAC, the complexity of the convention increases.172 That 
complexity increases the likelihood that the UNCAC will create 
diversity in national anti-corruption legislation rather than 
uniformity.173 Additionally, the UNCAC does not impose sanctions 
on its members for non-compliance.174 The possibility of sanctions 
would motivate the United States to bring its laws into compliance 
with the UNCAC’s anti-bribery provisions in order to avoid any 
future sanctions. 
C. ALTERNATIVE MODES THE UNITED STATES MAY PURSUE TO 
INCREASE ITS COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNCAC BRIBERY 
PROVISIONS 
Additionally, the United States may adopt legislation specifically 
addressing the issue of private sector bribery as prohibited by 
UNCAC Article 21. The non-self-executing nature of many of the 
UNCAC’s provisions, including Article 21, requires implementation 
through the national laws of participating countries.175 The United 
States may implement an original piece of legislation into domestic 
law to criminalize private sector bribery. Alternatively, the United 
States may adopt pre-existing international agreements that require 
signatories to prohibit private sector bribery in international business 
 
 171.  See Makinwa, supra note 43, at 35 (arguing that a permissive provision 
may lead to uncertainties in regulating international corruption). 
 172.  Lucinda A. Low, The Awakening Giant of Anticorruption Enforcement, 
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 4 (May 4, 2006), http://www.steptoe.com/assets/ 
attachments/2599.pdf (explaining that the UNCAC has over a dozen different 
levels of implementation obligations for State Parties, ranging from hard or 
mandatory obligations to very soft obligations, and that these variants increase the 
complexity of any analysis of the UNCAC). 
 173.  See id. at 5 (arguing that the complexity of UNCAC implementation 
obligations will create an even more diverse spectrum of national obligations). 
 174.  See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 140 (noting that the UNCAC does 
not have any provisions on sanctions and does not penalize its members for non-
compliance).  
 175.  See Low, supra note 172, at 4 (stating that many of the provisions of the 
UNCAC are not self-executing and “require implementation through the national 
laws of participating countries, as well as national enforcement”). 
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transactions. One such international agreement that would resolve 
the discrepancy between the anti-bribery provisions of the UNCAC 
and United States law is the International Institute for the Unification 
of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (“UNIDROIT Principles”).176 The 
UNIDROIT Principles proscribe bribery in any international 
business transaction, not limiting its scope to the public sector.177 By 
implementing new provisions dealing specifically with private sector 
bribery, the United States would fully incorporate the purpose of the 
UNCAC anti-bribery provisions within federal law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The FCPA is no longer an adequate doctrine that the United States 
should use to meet modern international law standards regarding 
bribery in international business transactions. The UNCAC strives to 
create “global anticorruption standards and obligations.”178 An 
agreement, however, is only as effective as the enforcement efforts 
by its members.179 The FCPA, as the United States’ primary 
anticorruption enforcement instrument, increasingly has been utilized 
to combat bribery.180 The United States has pushed the boundaries of 
 
 176.  UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, INT’L INST. 
FOR UNIFICATION PRIVATE L. art. 3.3.1 (2010), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversion
principles2010-e.pdf (“(1) Where a contract infringes a mandatory rule, whether of 
national, international or supranational origin, applicable under Article 1.4 of these 
Principles, the effects of that infringement upon the contract are the effects, if any, 
expressly prescribed by that mandatory rule. (2) Where the mandatory rule does 
not expressly prescribe the effects of an infringement upon a contract, the parties 
have the right to exercise such remedies under the contract as in the circumstances 
are reasonable.”). 
 177.  See id. art. 3.3.1 (using general language to prohibit the infringement of a 
contract under any mandatory rule whether national, international, or 
supranational). 
 178.  Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 106. 
 179.  See Robinson, supra note 9, at 309 (positing that the effectiveness of 
conventions is dependent upon a state’s willingness to alter the behavior of its 
society). 
 180.  See, Bixby, supra note 6, at 90 (discussing the FCPA’s evolution into 
becoming the United States’ foremost instrument for combating white-collar 
crime); Robinson, supra note 9, at 305 (stating that the United States prompted the 
international combat of corruption by enacting the FCPA, nationally criminalizing 
foreign bribery).  
  
752 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:3 
the FCPA by applying it well beyond the context of bribery of 
foreign public officials; consequently, the FCPA verges on 
applicability against private sector bribery concurrent with Article 21 
of the UNCAC.181 The tension between the language of the FCPA 
and the increasing need for its application within the private sector 
has created uncertainty that chills legitimate business investments.182 
Although the scope of the FCPA has expanded significantly, the 
Act is inefficient in meeting the purpose of the UNCAC embodied in 
the Convention’s anti-bribery provisions, specifically the private 
sector bribery prohibition of Article 21.183 The private sector bribery 
provision of the UNCAC represents an enduring trend in 
international law.184 The FCPA is no longer an adequate doctrine to 
address bribery in international business transactions because of its 
limitations relating to the private sector.185 If the United States wants 
to remain a leader in the effort to combat international corruption, it 
must make formal changes to bring itself in line with the new 
international law standards transcribed in the UNCAC Article 21 
private sector bribery prohibition.186 Until the U.S. government 
ceases using the FCPA as a limiting factor to U.S. anti-corruption 
policy, the United States will continue to fall behind in the sphere of 
international anti-bribery efforts, which renders it impossible for the 
United States to fully meet the UNCAC’s criminalization of 
 
 181.  See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 494 (noting that because of a recent 
radicalization of FCPA enforcement, which has altered the substantive law, a 
number of companies have been prosecuted under the FCPA). 
 182.  See Bonneau, supra note 63, at 394 (explaining that companies 
complained that the FCPA created uncertainty that could jeopardize legitimate 
business investment and put them at a disadvantage against competitors in 
countries where anti-bribery statutes were not as strict). 
 183.  See id. at 380 (stating that the broadening scope of liability will 
significantly affect the regulated community).  
 184.  See Robinson, supra note 9, at 303–04 (asserting that other countries 
besides the United States have become more aggressive in their anti-corruption 
laws and enforcement, not only within their own boundaries, but also globally). 
 185.  See Dunst, supra note 61, at 286 (stating that the FCPA no longer leads the 
worldwide anti-corruption enforcement effort due to the enactment of more 
advanced legislation by other countries, i.e. the UK Bribery Act). 
 186.  See Bonneau, supra note 63, at 396 (arguing that if the United States 
would like to remain a leader in the field of international anti-corruption, it must 
consider the possibility of amending the FCPA to bring it more in line with new 
international standards). 
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international bribery standards.187 
 
 
 187.  See Makinwa, supra note 43, at 34–36 (discussing how the liberal model 
of regulation does not motivate countries to alter their pre-existing legislation but 
allows countries to participate at the level of requirement of their particular legal, 
social, and political conditions). 
